In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycenter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project "Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution", 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality.
Introduction
The basis of cooperative game theory was laid in the book of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Since then several solution concepts for cooperative games have been proposed and several interesting subclasses of games have been introduced.
A highly interesting class of cooperative games is the class of convex games introduced by Shapley (1971) . For this cone of games many solution concepts behave nicely and much is known about their interrelations. Convex games also arise naturally in connection with economic situations as sequencing (Curiel et al., 1989) , bankruptcy (Curiel et al., 1988) , and financing of public goods. Airport fee problems are related with concave games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973) .
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with work of Aubin (1974 Aubin ( , 1981 where the notions of fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are introduced. In the meantime many solution concepts have been developed The purpose of this paper is on one hand to present a detailed characterization of the class of convex fuzzy games, and on the other hand to study the solution concept of participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas) for fuzzy games in connection with some solution concepts for these games.
It turns out that convex fuzzy games form a convex subcone of the cone of cooperative fuzzy games with a pamas.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are introductory; they provide the necessary notions and facts for crisp games and fuzzy games, respectively. Section 4 deals with convex fuzzy games. Characterizing properties are discussed. Special attention is paid to the core and some other related solution concepts for convex games. In Section 5 we introduce participation monotonic allocation schemes for fuzzy games and prove that each core element of a convex fuzzy game can be extended to such a scheme. Section 6 concludes with some final remarks.
Cooperative crisp games
In the following N is a finite set of players (often N = {1, 2, . . . , n}) and 2 N is the family of 2 |N| crisp subsets of N. A (crisp) cooperative game with player set N is a map v : 2 N → < with v(∅) = 0. For S ∈ 2 N , v(S) is called the worth of coalition S and it is interpreted as the amount of money (utility) the coalition can obtain, when the players in S work together.
The class of crisp games with player set N is denoted by G N . We recall now some well−known facts from the theory of cooperative crisp games. The class G N is a ¡ 2 |N| − 1 ¢ −dimensional linear space. The family of unanimity games © u T | T ∈ 2 N \ {∅} ª is an interesting basis of this linear space, where
Let Π(N) be the set of linear orderings of N. Then for each v ∈ G N and each σ ∈ Π(N) the marginal vector m σ (v) ∈ < N is defined as follows: the
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953) 
and the Weber set W (v) (Weber, 1988 ) is the convex hull of the marginal
The core of a game v ∈ G N (Gillies, 1953 ) is the convex set
consisting of efficient vectors with sum of the coordinates equal to v(N) and with the property that no coalition S can obtain more than P i∈S x i in splitting off.
It is well−known (Weber, 1988) 
Further, for convex games the Shapley value is the barycenter of the core (i.e. the average of the n! marginal vectors which are precisely the extreme points of the core).
Here a game v ∈ G N is called convex if it satisfies one of the following equivalent conditions (cf. Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981; Curiel, 1997) :
Increasing marginal contribution property for players: for each S, T ∈ 2 N with S ⊂ T and for
Increasing marginal contribution property for coalitions: for each S, T, U ∈
Stable marginal vector property: for each σ ∈ Π(N)
Note that (4) and the result of Weber (1988) imply that C(v) = W (v) for convex crisp games. Of course, the theory of cooperative crisp games is an inspiration source for the development of the theory of cooperative fuzzy games. Here operators Owen, 1972; Weiß, 1998 ). In the following we consider only the multilinear operator ml : Owen, 1972 ) and the crisp operator cr :
Cooperative fuzzy games
Here for a crisp game v ∈ G N , the multilinear extension ml(v) ∈ F G N is defined by
For a fuzzy game v ∈ F G N , the crisp game cr(v) ∈ G N is given by
Example 1 For the crisp unanimity game u T the multilinear extension is given by ml (u T ) (s) = Q i∈T s i (cf. Weiß, 1998) and cr (ml (u T )) = u T . Note that for the games v, w ∈ F G {1,2} , where
, we have cr(v) = cr(w).
In general the composition cr • ml : G N → G N is the identity map on
The core of a fuzzy game v (Aubin, 1974 ) is defined by
.
So x ∈ C(v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the grand coalition e N , where for each fuzzy coalition s, the total payoff is not smaller than v(s), if each player i ∈ N with participation level s i is paid s i x i .
Remark 1
The core C(cr(v)) of the crisp game corresponding to v includes
. Later we will see that for convex fuzzy games the two cores coincide.
Clearly, the core C(v) of a fuzzy game v is a closed convex subset of < Example 3 Take the two−person unanimity fuzzy game u (
2 ) where the value is 1 for all coalitions where the participation levels are at least 1 2 and 0
. 1 2 )´i s empty because for a core element x it should hold
¢ = 1 and also 1 2
Let us now introduce for a fuzzy game v the marginal vectors m σ (v) for each σ ∈ Π(N), the fuzzy Shapley value φ(v) and the fuzzy Weber set W (v)
as follows:
One can identify a σ ∈ Π(N) with an n−step walk along the edges of the hypercube of fuzzy coalitions starting in 0 and ending in e N by passing the vertices e σ(1) , e σ(1) + e σ(2) , . . . , P n−1 r=1 e σ(r) . The vector m σ (v) records the changes in value from vertex to vertex.
The result of Weber (1988) that the core of a crisp game is included in the Weber set of the game can be extended for fuzzy games as we see in
Proof. According to Remark 1 we have
Inspired by Owen (1972) one can define the diagonal value δ(v) for a C 1 −fuzzy game (i.e. a game v which is differentiable with continuous derivatives) as follows: for each i ∈ N the i−th coordinate of δ(v) is given by
where D i is the partial derivative of v with respect to the i−th coordinate.
Owen (1972) proved that for each crisp game v ∈ G N :
The next example shows that for a fuzzy game v, δ(v) and φ(cr(v)) may differ.
The cone of convex fuzzy games
Let N be a finite set and let v : [0, 1] N → < be a real−valued function on
where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0, 1] N with the i−th coordinate equal to max {s i , t i } and min {s i , t i }, respectively;
(ii) v is called a coordinate−wise convex function if for each i ∈ N and
Now we are ready for Some properties of convex fuzzy games are given in the next propositions.
is a convex crisp game.
Proof.
We will prove that cr(v) satisfies the supermodularity property (1). Take S, T ∈ 2 N and apply the supermodularity property (5) with e S , e T , e S∪T , e S∩T in the roles of s, t, s ∨ t, s ∧ t, respectively, and we obtain
The next property for convex fuzzy games is related with the increasing marginal contribution property (2) for players in crisp games. It states that a level increase of a player in a fuzzy coalition has more beneficial effect in a larger coalition than in a smaller coalition.
Proof. Suppose N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Define the fuzzy coalitions c 0 , c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n by c 0 = s 1 , and c
To prove (6) it is sufficient to show that for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} the in-
Note that (I i ) follows from the coordinate−wise convexity of v and
Also an analogue of the increasing marginal contribution property for coalitions (3) holds as we see in
For each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} it follows from Proposition 3 (with
Adding these n inequalities yields the inequality (7).
Important is the following proposition. 
Further, from the coordinate−wise convexity (by noting that s
resulting in the desired inequality.
We will call inequality (8) (ii) v satisfies the increasing average marginal return property (IAMR−property).
Proof.
We know from Proposition 5 that a convex game satisfies the IAMR−property. On the other hand it is clear that the IAMR−property implies the coordinate−wise convexity property. Hence, we only have to prove that the IAMR−property implies the supermodularity property. So, given s, t ∈ F N we have to prove that the supermodularity inequality (5) holds.
Let P = {i ∈ N | t i < s i }. If P = ∅, then (5) follows from the fact that s ∨ t = t, s ∧ t = s. For P 6 = ∅, arrange the elements of P in a sequence σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(p), where p = |P |, and put ε σ(k) = s σ(k) − t σ(k) > 0 for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}. Note that in this case
Hence,
From these equalities the supermodularity inequality (5) follows because the IAMR−property implies for each r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} :
As we see in the following theorem the stable marginal vector property (4) also holds for convex fuzzy games and the Weber set coincides with the core.
So the core is large; moreover it coincides with the core of the corresponding crisp game.
where the inequality follows by applying n times Proposition 5. Hence
(ii) From assertion (i) and the convexity of the core we obtain 
Example 7 (A public good game) Suppose n players want to create a facility for joint use. The cost of the facility depends on the sum of the participation levels of the players and it is described by k ( 
In case the functions g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n and −k are convex the fuzzy game v is a convex game.
For fuzzy games the core is a superadditive solution, i.e.
and the fuzzy games with a non−empty core form a cone.
For convex fuzzy games the core turns out to be an additive correspondence as we see in
Proposition 8
The core of a convex fuzzy game and the fuzzy Shapley value are additive solutions.
Proof. Let v, w be convex fuzzy games. Then
where the first equality follows from Theorem 7 (iii) and the third equality follows from the additivity of the core for convex crisp games (cf. Brânzei and Tijs, 2001). Further from φ(v) = φ(cr(v)) and the additivity of the Shapley value for convex crisp games it follows that φ(v + w) = φ(v) + φ(w).
Now we define fuzzy unanimity games and study some properties of these games. In the theory of cooperative crisp games unanimity games play an important role. Crisp unanimity games are all convex and have therefore a non−empty core.
For t ∈ F N , we denote by u t the simple fuzzy game defined by u t (s) = 1 if s ≥ t and u t (s) = 0 otherwise. We call this game the unanimity game based on t : a fuzzy coalition s is winning if the participation levels of s exceed weakly the corresponding participation levels of t; otherwise the coalition is losing, i.e. has value zero.
Note that for the unanimity game u t , the corresponding crisp game cr(u t )
is equal to u T , where u T is the crisp unanimity game based on T = supp(t) = {i ∈ N | t i > 0}.
Conversely, ml(u T ) is for no T ∈ 2 N Â {∅} a fuzzy unanimity game because ml(u T ) has a continuum of values:
The next proposition shows that for an unanimity game u t the gain 1 = u t (e N ) in a core element is divided among the members of t with full participation levels. Further only unanimity games u t , where all the participation levels of the players in t are 0 or 1 are convex.
Proposition 9 Let u t be the unanimity game based on the fuzzy coalition t.
Then
(i) The core C(u t ) is non-empty iff t k = 1 for some k ∈ N. In fact the core
(ii) The game u t is convex iff t = e T for some T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}.
Conversely, x ∈ C(u t ) implies that
(ii) Suppose t 6 = e T for some T ∈ 2 N \{∅}. Then there is a k ∈ N such that
implying that u t is not convex.
Conversely, suppose that t = e T for some T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. Then we show that u t has the supermodularity property and the coordinate−wise convexity property. Take s and k in F N . We can distinguish three cases.
(
consequently, at least one of the numbers u t (s) and
Hence, the supermodularity property holds for u e T .
Secondly, to prove the coordinate−wise convexity of u e T , note that all functions g s −i in the definition of coordinate−wise convexity are convex because they are either constant with value 0 or with value 1, or they have value 0 on [0, 1) and value 1 in 1. So u e T is a convex game.
Participation monotonic allocation schemes
Inspired by Sprumont (1990) (see also Hokari, 2000) , who considers the interesting notion of population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) for cooperative crisp games, we introduce here for fuzzy games the notion of participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas). In a pmas for the crisp game and for each crisp subgame there is given a core element and the core elements are related via a monotonicity condition. To be more precise, a pmas for a crisp game v : 2 N → < is an allocation scheme [a S,i ] S∈2 N \{∅},i∈S such that:
(i) (a S,i ) i∈S ∈ C(v S ) for each S ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, where v S is the subgame corresponding to S, i.e. v S : 2 S → < is the restriction of v : 2 N → < to 2 S ;
(ii) a S,i ≤ a T,i for all S, T ∈ 2 N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.
In our approach the role of subgames of a crisp game will be taken over by restricted games of a fuzzy game.
Definition 2 Let v ∈ F G N and t ∈ F N . Then the t−restricted game of v is the game v t : F N → < given by v t (s) = (t * s) for all s ∈ F N . Here t * s is the coordinate-wise product of t and s, so (t * s) i = t i s i .
Remark 4 When
s ∈ F N , and for s = e S we obtain v t (e S ) = v(e S∩T ). This implies that the restriction of cr(v e T ) : 2 N → < to 2 T is the subgame of cr(v) on the player set T . Moreover, in v e T each player i ∈ N \ T is a zero player, i.e.
Remark 5 Note that for each core element x ∈ C(v t ) we have x i = 0 for each i / ∈ supp(t). This follows from
where we use that i / ∈ supp(t) in the second and last equality, and that x ∈ C(v t ) in the two inequalities.
Remark 6 If v ∈ F G
N is a convex game, then also v t is a convex game for each t ∈ F N . This is the fuzzy analogue of the fact that subgames of crisp convex games are convex.
i a s,i for each s, t ∈ F N with s ≤ t and each i ∈ supp(s) (participation monotonicity condition).
Remark 7
Note that such a pamas is an ∞ × n−matrix, where the columns correspond to the players and the rows to the fuzzy coalitions. In each row t there is a core element of the game v t . The participation monotonicity condition implies that, if the scheme is used as regulator for the payoff distributions in the restricted fuzzy games, players are paid per unit of participation more in larger coalitions than in smaller coalitions.
Remark 8
Note that the collection of participation monotonic allocation schemes of a fuzzy game v is a convex set of ∞ × n−matrices. The relation between such a scheme and core elements is not studied there. Then for t 1 = e N \{2} , t 2 = e N\{1} , t 3 = e N\{4} , and t 4 = e N\{3} we have Example 2) , and so
, and this implies that there does not exist a pamas. Note that C (v t ) 6 = ∅ for each t ∈ F N , because
Definition 4 Let v ∈ F G N and x ∈ C(v). Then we call x pamas− extendable if there exists a pamas [a t,i ] t∈F N ,i∈N such that a e N ,i = x i for each i ∈ N.
In the next theorem we see that convex games have a pamas. Moreover, each core element is pamas−extendable.
Theorem 10 Let v ∈ F G N be a convex game and let x ∈ C(v). Then x is pamas−extendable.
Proof.
We know from Theorem 7 that x is in the convex hull of the So take σ ∈ Π N and define [a t,i ] t∈F N ,i∈N by a t,i = m
We claim that this scheme is a pamas extension of m σ (v).
Remark 5, each t−restricted game v t is a convex game, and from Theorem 7 it follows that (a t,i ) i∈N ∈ C(v t ). Hence the scheme satisfies the stability condition.
To prove the participation monotonicity condition, take s, t ∈ F N with s ≤ t and i ∈ supp(s) and let k be the element in N such that i = σ(k). We have to prove that t 2 ), and the scheme [a t,i ] t∈F N ,i∈{1,2} with a t,1 = 4t 1 (t 1 − 2), a t,2 = 10(t 2 ) 2 is a pamas extension of φ(v), with the fuzzy Shapley value of v t in each row t of the scheme, so [a t,i ] t∈F N ,i∈{1,2} is the total fuzzy Shapley value of v.
Concluding Remarks
Game theoretic approaches to cooperative situations in fuzzy environments have given rise to several types of cooperative fuzzy games. We mention here games with fuzzy coalitions and games with fuzzy coalition values. For a survey see Nishizaki and Sakawa (2001) . Our study concerns cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions. We study in this paper the cone of convex fuzzy games that lies in the cone of cooperative fuzzy games with a participation monotonic allocation scheme. Convex fuzzy games have an interesting large core, where each element is pamas−extendable, and where the fuzzy Shapley values of the game and its restricted games form a pamas. In the theory of cooperative crisp games this pamas corresponds to the population monotonic allocation rule, known as the total Shapley value. For convex crisp games there is another interesting population monotonic allocation rule, namely the pmas-extension of the egalitarian rule of Dutta and Ray (Hokari, 2000) . It would be interesting to find such an egalitarian rule for convex fuzzy games, too. Another goal for further research could be to find a subclass of convex fuzzy games, where the diagonal values of the game and its restricted games lead to a pamas.
Also other solutions could be developed and/or studied for convex fuzzy games, e.g. those corresponding to solutions such as: stable set, kernel and bargaining set for cooperative crisp games.
To find variants of convex fuzzy games when other types of fuzziness are considered, seems to be another interesting direction for future research.
